Nothing left now but . . .

Or to Arms.


The Modern Militiaman's Internet Gazette

August 4, 1997, Issue #8-97

Police Misconduct As Usual


Purpose: Our purpose is to serve the Resistance/Patriot Movement as a bi-weekly gazette providing news and commentary favorable to our cause in a format accessible to the general public.

The news from e-mail listings is shown in preformatted text. This news will be attributed to its authors/editors and is entirely the opinion of that particular author/editor.
One of the reasons for this is to cut down on the spamming and foolishness inherent in raw e-mail in order to provide a forum for discussion of Resistance Movement issues.

Commentary is in regular format and is solely the opinions of the Editor and Staff of Modern Militiaman Internet Gazette.

Editor Martin Lindstedt

Fable of Contents

1. This Issue's Editorial Commentary
3. FBI Infiltration -- As Usual
4. Real Jewel
5. Still A Few Good Men
6. The Carl Drega Incident -- Associated Press
7. California War Syndrome -- JJ Johnson


--Editor Martin Lindstedt .










FBI Infiltration -- As Usual

Date: Thu, 31 Jul 1997 09:56:44 -0400 (EDT)
Subject: SAFAN NO. 580.  Militias: Initiating Contact - 
[From the FBI Web Pages!]

SAFAN Internet Newsletter, No. 580, July 31, 1997
by James E. Duffy and Alan C. Brantley, M.A.
FBI Web page:

Proactive dialogue with certain types of militia groups may help law 
enforcement agencies diffuse tensions and avert potential flash points. 

Special Agent Duffy serves with the Critical Incident Response Group's 
Crisis Management Unit at the FBI Academy. Special Agent Brantley 
serves with the Profiling and Behavioral Assessment Unit at the FBI 

The growth of the organized militia movement represents one of the most 
significant social trends of the 1990s. This significance is due less 
to the actual size of the movement -- by all measures, militia 
membership remains an almost imperceptible percentage of the 
population -- than it is to the potential for death and destruction 
emanating from the most radical elements of the movement. 

Few Americans knew of the militia movement or antigovernment extremists 
until the morning of April 19, 1995, when a bomb blast destroyed the 
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.  Although 
no apparent direct connection exists between members of any militia 
group and the bombing, those arrested held and expressed views 
espoused by some militia groups.  Following the bombing, television, 
newspaper, and magazine features presented in-depth -- if somewhat 
alarmist -- expose of the militia movement and the beliefs and values 
of militia members.

While the intense scrutiny given the militia movement during the past 
few years has served to educate the public, as well as police officials, 
about the fundamental beliefs and motivations of militia groups, this 
scrutiny also has served to raise as many questions as it has answered. 

  *   What specific factors have fueled the growth of the militia 
  *  What immediate aims do militia groups wish to achieve? 
  *  Are militia leaders primarily driven by defensive or aggressive
  *  What explains the suspicion and distrust many militia members 
     apparently feel toward law enforcement? 

Of course, such questions can only be answered with any degree of 
accuracy by militia members themselves. So, to move beyond a surface 
understanding of the militia movement, logic dictates that law 
enforcement agencies go to the source, local militia leaders, to learn 
more detailed information. 

This suggestion is not as impudent as it might first appear. In fact, 
as part of a broad-based effort to establish positive contacts between 
law enforcement agencies and local militia groups, simply establishing 
a dialogue with militia leaders can go a long way to removing some of 
the mystery that provides fertile ground for the suspicion and distrust 
that exist in both camps. This article first summarizes what is known 
about the militia movement and then suggests a strategy that law 
enforcement agencies can use to initiate constructive dialogue with 
militia groups that have not demonstrated a propensity for 
aggressiveness and violence.  The article also includes a threat 
assessment typology recently developed by the FBI to assist agencies 
in determining the threat level posed by individual militia groups. 


Most militia organization members are white males who range in age from 
the early 20s to the mid-50s. The majority of militia members appear to 
be attracted to the movement because of gun control issues, as 
epitomized by the Brady Law, which established a 5-day waiting period 
prior to the purchase of a handgun, and the 1994 Violent Crime Control 
and Law Enforcement Act, which limited the sale of various assault-
style weapons.  Many militia members believe that these legislative 
initiatives represent a government conspiracy to disarm the 
populace and ultimately abolish the Second Amendment to the 
Constitution.  The federal government's role in confrontations with 
the Branch Davidians near Waco, Texas, and Randy Weaver at Ruby Ridge, 
Idaho, have further fueled conspiratorial beliefs that the government 
is becoming more tyrannical and attempting to reverse constitutional 

Militia members generally maintain strong Christian beliefs and 
justify their actions by claiming to be ardent defenders of the 
Constitution.  They often compare the American Colonial period 
(1607-1783) to their present existence by relating significant 
Colonial dates and events to lend historical weight to their own
beliefs and actions. Many militias claim to represent the ideological 
legacy of the founding fathers tracing their core beliefs to select 
writings and speeches that predate the Revolutionary War.  Colonists 
at that time rebelled against the tyranny of King George III and what 
they saw as the British government's practice of oppression and unjust 
taxation.  Various present-day militias pattern their actions on 
what they believe their ideological ancestors would do if they were 
alive today. 

Using their interpretation of constitutional rights and privileges as 
their calling, militia members and antigovernment extremists have 
challenged federal and state laws and questioned the authority of 
elected officials to govern, tax, and maintain order. In doing so, 
they have created concerns for law enforcement and public officials 
who come into contact with them.  Still, many militia members and 
individuals who espouse antigovernment beliefs remain law-abiding 
citizens and do not advocate terrorist acts. Many organized militias 
have, in fact, condemned the Oklahoma City bombing and have stated 
that those responsible for the attack do not represent the philosophy 
and goals of today's militia groups. 

Clearly, elements of the militia movement represent a threat to law 
enforcement and to the general public.  At the same time, the militia 
movement is far from the monolithic terrorist conspiracy that some 
media accounts have portrayed it to be. 

* How can law enforcement agencies determine which groups represent 
  more of a threat than others? 
*  How can agency commanders assess the specific beliefs and philosophies 
  of the groups they may encounter in their own jurisdictions? 

In many cases, all they need to do is ask. 


Law enforcement officials should make proactive contacts with local 
militia leaders so that the two sides can voice their concerns and 
discuss relevant issues in a nonconfrontational way.  Agency executives 
can establish the initial contact simply by calling the local militia 
leadership and arranging an informal meeting at a mutually agreeable 
location.  By talking, law enforcement officials allow militia 
representatives to assess the character of the officers apart from the 
positions they hold. 

Nonconfrontational dialogue also allows for a moderation of any negative 
stereotypes that militia members might hold toward law enforcement 
officers.  Conversely, such contact should allow law enforcement 
representatives the chance to gauge and assess the true, or at least 
unprovoked, nature of the militia leaders. 

After making the initial contact, a law enforcement agency should be 
in a position to arrange for future meetings, especially if a 
troubling issue arises or a crisis appears imminent.  When each side 
realizes that the other is not as threatening or unreasonable as 
originally believed, nonconfrontational contacts will reduce anxiety 
levels and the potential for misunderstanding.  At times of impending 
crisis, established contacts will keep open the avenues of communication, 
enhancing the opportunities for affected parties to understand the 
issues and to resolve trouble in a peaceful manner.  Such rational 
problem-solving strategies greatly increase the likelihood of achieving 
agreement between two groups whose goals may appear to be at cross 
purposes but, in reality, may be quite similar. 


Since the Oklahoma City bombing, a growing number of law enforcement 
officials have established regular contacts with militia leaders in 
their jurisdictions.  These contacts have improved understanding and 
promoted ongoing relationships between leaders of both groups.  
Contacts with militia groups should be made by ranking departmental 
personnel who are in a position to speak with authority for the agency. 
Ideally, the agency's commanding officer should meet with the militia 
group's leader, as the two can best represent the goals, objectives, 
and legal positions of their respective organizations. 

Historically, militia groups have placed more trust in county sheriffs'
offices than in other law enforcement agencies, whether they are 
federal, state, or city.  Law enforcement agencies at any level that 
previously have established contacts with local militia leaders should 
assist other agencies attempting to do so.  In this way, law enforcement 
invokes a unified presence and demonstrates its ability to work 
together without territorial conflict, a strength militia leaders will 

Of course, law enforcement officials should take appropriate strategic 
precautions when meeting with militia groups. They should advise their 
agencies of the time and location of any meetings and should make sure 
meetings take place in areas that afford safety and security. 

Nature of Contacts 

Law enforcement agencies should not use contacts with militia groups as 
a way to gain or confirm intelligence information. Law enforcement 
possesses many ways to obtain intelligence and should not risk inflaming
the suspicions of militia leaders by asking probing questions. Likewise, 
law enforcement representatives should not volunteer any sensitive 
information to militia representatives, as such disclosures may expose 
sources or investigative techniques.  During the initial meeting, law 
enforcement representatives should set a conversational tone that will 
lead to an open discussion of issues important to both sides. The goal 
is to establish an ongoing relationship. 

During a recent incident in Louisiana involving a barricaded subject 
with militia connections, the value of a pre-established dialogue 
became apparent.

As the incident unfolded, local militia leaders reached out to their 
law enforcement contacts to verify the information they received from 
various sources.  Because law enforcement officials previously had 
established trust with militia leaders, the police were able to dispel 
false information being publicly conveyed by the subject. The subject 
eventually surrendered peacefully to the FBI and local law enforcement 
officials.  Pre-established contacts allowed law enforcement to provide 
local militia leaders the facts surrounding the incident and to quell 
the misinformation and rumors that had spread through elements of the 
militia community. 


Law enforcement agencies must exercise caution before initiating 
contact with militia groups. Because different groups operating within 
the same geographic area may pose widely varying degrees of threats, 
law enforcement officials should assess the threat level of a militia 
before attempting to make contact.  In most cases, it is unadvisable 
to attempt proactive contact with groups that openly advocate violence 
toward law enforcement or other public agencies.  To assist agencies 
in gauging the threat level posed by militia groups, special agents in 
the FBI's Critical Incident Response Group developed the Militia 
Threat Assessment Typology.  Law enforcement agencies can use the 
typology to help determine which groups should and should not be 
contacted on a proactive basis. 

Within the typology, category I groups represent the least threat to law 
enforcement agencies; category IV groups represent the greatest threat. 
Generally, only militia groups in categories I and II should be 
considered candidates for proactive contact.  Given the type of criminal 
activity, threatening behavior, and paranoia exhibited by members of 
category III and IV militia groups, law enforcement officials should 
refrain from attempting to establish contact with leaders of these 


Before law enforcement officials attempt to make contact with leaders 
of any militia group, they should consult with other agencies that also 
may have an investigative interest.  This allows agencies the 
opportunity to report the status of their activities and provide 
information that could prevent a well-intentioned contact from having 
a negative impact on ongoing investigations. 


Communication represents a key component to successful policing. 
Initiating and maintaining dialogue with the less dangerous elements 
of the militia movement enable law enforcement agencies to establish 
communication with militias on constructive, nonconfrontational terms. 
With communication established, agencies and militia leaders can 
discuss issues openly and avert potential problems. If crises do 
develop, law enforcement commanders can use pre-established contacts 
to reach out to militia leaders and diffuse tensions.  As a growing 
number of agencies have learned, the best time to begin talking is 
before trouble erupts. 


The Militia Threat Assessment Typology was developed by Special Agent 
Alan C. Brantley and former Special Agent Gregory Cooper of the FBI's
Critical Incident Response Group, Quantico, VA.  The typology is based 
on the agents' experience and research into militia groups.  For more 
information concerning the Militia Threat Assessment Typology, contact 
the authors at the FBI Academy, Quantico, VA 22135.  

The Militia Threat Assessment Typology

Category I Militia Groups
*  Conduct paramilitary training
*  Base their organizational philosophies on antigovernment rhetoric
*  Maintain a primarily defensive philosophical posture. Plans for 
   violent action are contingent upon perceived government provocation
*  Engage in no known criminal activity.

Category II Militia Groups
*  Conduct paramilitary training
*  Base their organizational philosophies on antigovernment rhetoric
*  Maintain a primarily defensive philosophical posture. Plans for 
   violent action are contingent upon perceived government provocation
*  Engage in criminal activity to acquire weapons and explosives. 
   Criminal activity may range from minor firearms violations, e.g., 
   illicit weapons sales and transfer, to illegal firearms modifications 
   and property crimes.

Category III Militia Groups
*  Conduct paramilitary training
*  Base their organizational philosophies on extreme antigovernment 
   rhetoric, denoting deep suspicion and paranoia. Group may direct 
   threats toward specific individuals or institutional targets
*  Maintain a primarily defensive philosophical posture. Plans for 
   violent action are contingent upon perceived government provocation, 
   but response plans are highly detailed and may include an escalation 
   of overt acts beyond planning, such as testing explosive devices, 
   gathering intelligence, and identifying/conducting surveillance of 
   potential targets
*  Engage in criminal activity, ranging from property crimes to crimes 
   of interpersonal violence, e.g., resisting arrest, armed robberies,
   burglaries, and attempts to provoke confrontations with government 

Category IV Militia Groups
*  Demonstrate many of the same traits and characteristics as category 
   III groups but are likely to be smaller, more isolated cells or 
   fringe groups whose members have grown frustrated with their peers' 
   unwillingness to pursue a more aggressive strategy.  Unlike militias 
   in the other categories, category IV groups often maintain an openly 
   offensive, rather than defensive, posture
*  May grow out of other less threatening militia groups or may evolve 
   independently from any other group associations 
*  Often attract individuals with frank mental disorders. These 
   individuals may either act alone or with a small number of associates 
   who share similar paranoid/disordered beliefs
*  Plot and engage in serious criminal activity, e.g., homicide, 
   bombings, and other acts of a terrorist nature.
                          ( o   o )
"Resistance to tyrants is obedience to God."  Thomas Jefferson
 SAFAN %Dot Bibee  (  Ph/FAX (423) 577-7011
 SAFAN Internet Newsletters are archived on



At 04:10 AM 8/2/97 -0400, you wrote: 

   I am taking the liberty of requoting the entire section of the 
original message which goes into the typology of militia units that 
was developed by the FBI. Understanding the premise underlying the 
typology is *vital* to an understanding of how the government views 
the militia movement and how they will react to it. 
   It should be obvious to all who *carefully* study the typology 
that the government, or at least the FBI agents who developed the 
typology, see no validity at all to the militia movement. This can 
be demonstrated from the fact that they view all militia units as 
falling into one of the four types discussed below. However, all 
of the types of militia units under discussion have "antigovernment 
rhetoric" as a basic organizational philosophy. 
  Thus, they are saying that there is little common ground between 
themselves, people who work for the government, and militia units 
who have "antigovernment rhetoric" as their basic philosophy. How 
could it be any other way? The entire typology is a "threat 
assessment" typology, which therefore would tend to preclude the 
idea that the government would at any time be willing to seriously 
listen to those groups which are espousing "antigovernment rhetoric." 
Therefore, any "cooperation" that takes place between militia units 
and the government will be solely at the government's discretion, 
with no acknowledgement by the government that there are any 
serious problems with how it is doing business. 
  I am sorry people, but by the very way that they have set up this 
typology, which will be sent to law enforcement agencies all over the 
country, they are just about precluding the chance for a reasonable, 
peaceful settlement of the legitimate grievances that the various 
different patriot groups and militia units have with the government. 
Because if all that is underlying their philosophy is such 
"antigovernment rhetoric" as the Constitution for the United States 
of America; the Declaration of Independence; The Federalist Papers; 
the various different writings of the Founding Fathers; the lion's 
share of the U.S. Supreme Court decisions prior to 1933 and even 
quite a few U.S. Supreme Court decisions after that year, and it is 
all "antigovernment rhetoric", then what pray tell is *government* 
rhetoric? The idea that the government can do anything it darn well 
wants to? Sorry people, that isn't what this country was founded on, 
and that's not what all the currently serving agents of government 
are sworn to protect and defend.  And if they can't recognize any 
legitimate difference between the form of government that they are 
sworn to protect and defend, versus the idea that government can do 
anything it wants to, then they are the ones who are either misled, 
delusional or simply power hungry. In which case, to the extent that 
they cannot be swayed by the force of logical argumentation 
based on the documents upon which this country and the current 
government were founded on, then that means at some point in time 
down the road that force will be the only answer. 
   I pray it does not come to that, but Special Agent Alan C. Brantley 
and former Special Agent Gregory Cooper have effectively defined 
away any hope for a peaceful and reasonable solution. 

-- Mike/North Central Florida Regional Militia 



Editorial Commentary: Reading this is of value to the Resistance movement because it illustrates how the gubbnmint forces view the militia movement. That is its sole value to us because its use as gubbnmint propaganda to the witless is a factor beyond our control.

To a gubbnmintgungoon we are by default a bunch of criminals because of our “anti-gubbnmint rhetoric” denoting our criminal mind-set and our “paramilitary training” against our state-god enemy. It is just a hop, skip and jump before we all make the inevitable step from thought crime to actual crime. Such is the thinking of the police mind-set.

This limited thought pattern is invaluable for our side. Their little police minds can only handle criminology as they have observed it in ordinary criminals, usually a less than intelligent breed when they don’t go into gubbnmint service. Such thinking means that they will never ever be able to understand us, while we understand them. Knowing your enemy while he is clueless as to your motivations and purposes is a great advantage.

It is not the large open public militia groups, who are still regarded as criminals and terrorists, that the FiBbIe ‘behavioral scientists’ treat as the greatest threat. Since these small cells are undetectable, and because they are sovereign individuals uncontrolled by hierarchical command, they are regarded as the greatest threat by these superstitious gubbnmintgungoon behavioral witch-doctors. They are unknown and thus unknowable -- random-appearing and thus ‘crazy.’ These 'behavioral scientists' make a virtue of the inevitable -- since they cannot infiltrate a cell, they prohibit the impossible.

So should ‘communication’ be used to help ‘good policing?’ Sure, by all means. Let the big open public militias attract the bulk of FiBbIe in-fill-traitors listening to would-be Thomas Jeffersons whine about how the paper idol granting gubbnmint legitimacy is presently powerless to save them from the fury of the gubbnmint. Fill them FiBbIes with disinformation as to goals, strategy and tactics. Let them think they have us all figured out. Let the militia generals cut a deal with the feds. Since it is their deal we need not honor it or even acknowledge it.


-- Martin Lindstedt



Real Jewel

Date: Thu, 24 Jul 1997 02:55:31 -0400
From: Warlord (
To: Hammer of God (
Subject: Jewel

We Passed this CONFIRMED info out yesterday but had lost your addy.  
   One of my Federal friends called and said that Richard Jewel (of 
Atlanta Olympic park bombing fame) had cut a deal with the Feds for 
employment with them as part of his 500,000 dollar settlement.  He is 
going to be trying to infiltrate as many Militias as possible.  The 
militia in Summersville WV was their first target... Sure enough, he 
showed up here in WV at one of our members surplus shop asking 
questions, telling how pissed he was at the feds, and asking 
questions... he spent a LOT of money buying gear and equipment... the 
guys took a picture with him  to prove he was there and then tossed 
him out after they got into an argument with him.  He is driving a 
white sport utility vehical (may be a bronco).  He is flashing lots of 
cash! He is working for the Feds.



Still A Few Good Men

Date: Tue, 12 Aug 1997 23:25:54 -0400 (EDT)
Subject: SAFAN NO. 607. [Wyoming] Sheriff Boots Feds From His County

SAFAN Internet Newsletter, No. 607, August 12, 1997
by Phil Hamby (Knoxville Journal, August 7-13, 1997 pA1 and A6
( Ph (423) 546-5353 FAX 0858

     Sheriff Dave Mattis of Big Horn County, Wyoming, said this week 
that as a result of Case #96-CV099-J, U.S. District Court, District of 
Wyoming, he how has a written policy that forbids federal officials 
from entering his county and exercising authority over county residents 
unless he is notified first of their intentions.
     After explaining their mission, Mattis said he grants them 
permission to proceed if he is convinced they are operating within the 
legal parameters and authority limitations set forth in the U.S. 
     The sheriff grants permission on a case-by-case basis only.  When 
asked what, if any, repercussions he had gotten from the Feds, he 
quickly and confidently replied, "None whatsoever."   He explained by 
saying, "They know they do not have jurisdiction in my county unless I 
grant it to them."
     Mattis clarified his position by saying the federal court had ruled 
the state of Wyoming is a sovereign state and the state constitution 
plainly states that a county sheriff is the top law enforcement official 
in the county.
     Additionally, Sheriff Mattis contends that the U.S. Constitution,
Article 1, Section 8, clearly defines the geographic territories where 
the federal government has jurisdiction.  Amendment X, he said, states 
that "the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, 
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people."
     Therefore, Mattis thoroughly believes the Feds have very limited 
powers in any state unless the local high-sheriff allows them to 
exercise power beyond that which the Constitution provides.
     "Put another way," Mattis said, "if the sheriff doesn't want the 
Feds in his county, he has the constitutional power and right to keep 
them out or ask them to leave."
     Accompanied with other legal interpretations Mattis stands on the 
definition of the world "sovereign," which is defined by Webster's as 
"paramount, supreme.  Having supreme rank or power.  Independent: 
a sovereign State."
     Mattis said he grew weary of the Feds coming into his county and 
running rough-shod over county residents: i.e., illegally searching, 
seizing property, confiscating bank accounts, restricting the free use 
of private lands and other abuses, without a valid warrant and without 
first following due process of law as guaranteed by the Constitution to 
every citizen.
     As long as Mattis remains sheriff he says he will continue to see 
to it that the citizens of his county get their day in court.
     Mattis went on to say that, to his knowledge, even the IRS has not 
attempted to seize any citizen's real property, bank account or any 
other private-owned possessions since he ran the Feds out of his county. 
     Sheriff Mattis emphasized that he is not a radical man.  He said he 
is only dedicated to protecting the constitutional rights of the 
citizens of his county.
     He added that ordinary citizens are not the only ones bound by and 
expected to obey laws.  Elected officials and government employees at 
all levels of government are also bound by and should be expected to 
obey certain laws.
     As long as Sheriff Mattis is the high-sheriff of Big Horn County, 
he seems determined to make sure private citizens and government 
officials alike act within the law and their designated powers.
     Sheriff Mattis came across as a soft-spoken, polite man whose only 
interest is protecting the citizens he was elected to serve.  That being 
the case, he might be the sheriff for as long as he wants to be.  
     Sheriff Mattis is hopeful that other sheriffs will assume the same 
c. 1997 The Knoxville Journal

***SEE ALSO SAFAN 608.  Sheriff's Determination Derails Brady Bill.

    [ED. NOTE:  Is the Knox County Sheriff paying attention?  If not, 
    then perhaps we can find a gentle, soft-spoken man like Sheriff 
    Mattis to RUN and defeat the current sheriff.  Hopefully, Sheriff 
    Hutchinson will take up the challenge and assume the same stance 
    as Sheriff Mattis!  ....Dot Bibee]

      	                ( o   o )
     "Resistance to tyrants is obedience to God."  Thomas Jefferson
  SAFAN %Dot Bibee  (  Ph/FAX (423) 577-7011
  SAFAN Internet Newsletters are archived on 
              Index of Newsletters are available upon Request



Date: Tue, 12 Aug 1997 23:27:59 -0400 (EDT)
Subject: SAFAN NO. 608.  Sheriff's Determination Derails Brady Bill

 SAFAN Internet Newsletter, No. 608, August 12, 1997
by Phil Hamby ["Straight Talk", Knoxville Journal, Aug 7-13, 1997, p A4]

   The newspaper business, not unlike most other businesses, has its 
ups and downs, good days, bad days, times when the big story falls into 
your lap and others when it is next to impossible to fit all the pieces 
together.  There are times when it feels good to expose situations and 
individuals for what they really are.  It is especially gratifying to 
know that maybe, just maybe, a story helped protect the citizenry from 
an unscrupulous public official.
     There is a downside, however.  I have commented to friends many 
times that the deeper you dig into politics the dirtier it gets.  If I
allowed myself to dwell on the corruption I would mope around in a 
depressed state most of the time.
     Then there are days like today when a simple phone conversation 
with a total stranger hundreds of miles away can be as uplifting as a 
touch from the Master.  Well, not that uplifting, but still an 
exhilarating feeling.
     A loyal supporter of the Journal and friend, Robert Stallings, a 
few days ago brought me a list of seven individuals who have opposed 
Big Brother and won!!
     Today I phoned former Sheriff Richard Mack of Safford, AZ.  Mack, 
as Sheriff, had refused to enforce the Brady Bill in his county from the 
onset.  He is of the conviction that the Feds have no jurisdiction over 
gun control in the sovereign 50 states.  Furthermore, he contends the 
Second Amendment clearly gives citizens the right to bear arms and the 
Brady Bill infringes upon that right.
     Unknown to Sheriff Mack, Sheriff Jay Printz of Hamilton, Montana, 
had taken the same position.
     Although Mack and Printz filed separate suits in different states, 
their cases were very similar.  Due to the similarities of the suits 
they were combined in a ruling from the U.S. Supreme Court.  The 
essence of the ruling was to find the Brady Bill unconstitutional.
     The Supreme Court decision was a result of a long and arduous 
fight, but the victory was bittersweet for Mack.  Standing for what he 
believed made him the victim of much criticism, threats and personal 
losses.  Not only did the long fight against the Feds cost Mack his 
sheriff's job, it cost him all of his personal possessions, including 
his home.
     I have great sympathy for him in his disastrous situation, but I 
also have great admiration for him in his stance for what is right.
     If more people followed Mack's lead, maybe it would not be 
necessary for one man to suffer such severe personal and financial loss. 
     I'll write more about our conversation in a future column.  Mack 
is mailing the 26-page U.S. Supreme Court decision to me so that I may 
discuss it in more detail later.
c 1997 The Knoxville Journal

    ED. NOTE:  Robert Stallings is the "patriot" in the above story
    (RDS  He is new on the internet - and thanks to 
    his foresight and ingenuity contacted Jack McLamb who gave him 
    the telephone numbers of Sheriff's in several states who have 
    bravely stood up to the Feds in their own county.  Phil Hamby 
    agreed to call these Sheriffs and help bring this to everyone's 
    attention.  THANKS to both Phil and Robert for these stories - 
    just the beginning of how Americans can still stand up for what 
    they believe in.   .......REPOST THIS STORY...Dot Bibee
      	                ( o   o )
     "Resistance to tyrants is obedience to God."  Thomas Jefferson
  SAFAN %Dot Bibee  (  Ph/FAX (423) 577-7011
  SAFAN Internet Newsletters are archived on 
              Index of Newsletters are available upon Request


Copyright 1997. Modern Militiaman Internet Gazette



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